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The more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become: they grow less likely to join intergovernmen-
tal organizations, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and to agree to binding arbitration
for investment disputes. This pattern is robust to the use of country and year fixed effects, to alternative measures of the
key variables, and to the exclusion of all countries in the Middle East. To explain this pattern, we consider the economic
incentives that foster participation in international institutions: the desire to attract foreign investment and to gain access
to foreign markets. Oil-exporting states, we argue, find it relatively easy to achieve these aims without making costly com-
mitments to international institutions. In other words, natural resource wealth liberates states from the economic pressures
that would otherwise drive them toward cooperation.
Oil-exporting states puzzle scholars of international coop-
eration. These states are highly integrated into the global
economy. Thus, their reliance on trade, international fi-
nance, and foreign workers should give their governments
a major stake in the health of global markets and the in-
ternational institutions that facilitate the transnational
flow of goods and finance.1
Yet oil exporters are often at odds with international
norms and institutions. Some oil exporters, such as
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Oman, and Turkmenistan,
choose to remain politically isolated despite their depen-
dence on foreign trade and finance. Other exporters,
such as Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and until recently, Iraq
and Libya, actively defy global norms, invade neighboring
countries, expropriate foreign investors, flout human
rights, and finance terrorism and armed rebellions in for-
eign countries.
We argue that the more a country depends on oil ex-
ports, the less engaged it is in institutionalized coopera-
tion. These findings are robust to controls for potentially
confounding variables, to the inclusion of fixed country
and year effects, to alternative measures of both oil ex-
ports and international cooperation, and to the exclusion
of all states in the Middle East from the dataset.
To explain this pattern, we contend that oil wealth
weakens two economic incentives that normally compel
states to participate in international institutions: the need
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and the need to
gain access to foreign markets. Oil exporters benefit from
unusually easy access to both FDI and foreign markets,
which leaves them with fewer reasons to make costly com-
mitments to international institutions.
We assume that states participate in international insti-
tutions when they believe the benefits will outweigh the
costs. Since oil exporters accrue fewer benefits, they are
only likely to join organizations that carry minimal obliga-
tions and, hence, have low sovereignty costs. Even if they
opt out of broader institutions, they may still join interna-
tional organizations that carry no binding commitments.
For example, twelve of the world’s thirty-seven net oil ex-
porters are members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), a small, highly specialized
organization that sets nominal export quotas for its mem-
bers. Yet, OPEC entails surprisingly low sovereignty costs:
it rarely enforces its export quotas, which hence have no
measurable impact on the actual exports of its members
(Colgan 2014).
Our argument may help explain the uncooperative
policies of states like Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and pre-
invasion Iraq and Libya. It also casts light on the eco-
nomic roots of international cooperation. Recent studies
focus on the political determinants of participation in in-
ternational institutions, suggesting that when countries
are more liberal or democratic, or undergoing transitions
to democracy, they become more likely to join intergov-
ernmental organizations (IGOS) (Mansfield and
Pevehouse 2006), accede to international courts (Kelley
2007; Moravcsik 2000), accept legalized dispute resolution
(Mitchell 2002), engage in deeper regional integration
(Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2008), participate in
United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (Lebovic
2004), and otherwise cooperate through international in-
stitutions (Martin 2000; Milner 1997).
Our analysis confirms these findings. We show that de-
mocracy and democratization are consistently associated
with greater cooperation. We also find, however, that the
substantive effect of being an oil exporter is similar to or
greater than the effect of being a democracy. It also af-
fects a large number of countries. In 2010, twenty-seven
states—from all world regions—depended on petroleum
for at least 50 percent of their exports.
Michael Ross (mlross@polisci.ucla.edu) is a Professor at the Department
of Political Science, UCLA.
Erik Voeten (ev42@georgetown.edu) is the Peter F. Krogh Associate
Professor of Geopolitics and Justice in World Affairs at Georgetown University.
1We use the terms oil, petroleum, and fuels to refer to both oil and natu-
ral gas.
Ross, Michael L., and Eric Voeten. (2015) Oil and International Cooperation. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqv003
VC The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Studies Association. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
International Studies Quarterly (2015) 0, 1–13
 International Studies Quarterly Advance Access published December 15, 2015
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 21, 2015
http://isq.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Our analysis also helps clarify the relationship between
trade and the demand for international institutions.
Recent empirical studies on the determinants of joining
IGOs (see Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008) typically
find no evidence to support the venerable claim that eco-
nomic interdependence leads to international cooperation
(see, for example, Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 1977). We
suspect that this lack of support derives from the failure of
scholars to distinguish between the trade in petroleum and
the trade in other goods. Our analysis finds that when we
distinguish oil exports from other types of exports, it turns
out that the former correlates with less cooperation while
the latter correlates with more cooperation.
A close reading of one of the seminal books on interna-
tional cooperation already hints at our insight. Keohane
and Nye (1977, 9) distinguished between a country’s inter-
connectedness with other states, which results from trade of
all types, and its interdependence, which is a function of a
country’s reliance on commodities for which demand is
highly inelastic. They suggest that institutionalized coop-
eration is not produced by mere interconnectedness, but
instead by interdependence:
A country that imports all of its oil is likely to be
more dependent on the continuing flow of petro-
leum than a country importing furs, jewelry, and
perfume (even of equivalent monetary value) will be
on uninterrupted access to these luxury goods.
Where there are reciprocal (although not necessar-
ily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there
is interdependence. Where interactions do not have
significant costly effects, there is simply interconnec-
tedness. (Keohane and Nye 1977, 9)
Hence a country “that imports all of its oil” should expe-
rience more interdependence and thus be inclined towards
institutionalized cooperation. At the same time, an oil-
exporting country that only imports luxury goods (such as
“furs, jewelry, and perfume”) should have a lower level of
interdependence and be less likely to favor cooperative in-
stitutions. If Keohane and Nye are correct, oil-importing
countries should be more likely than oil-exporting states to
support institutionalized cooperation.
To our knowledge, no one has directly tested this idea.
Some scholars comment on the apparent detrimental effect
of oil exports on different types of cooperation. Most, how-
ever, focus on regional cooperation. For example, Moses and
Jenssen (1998) and Mattli (1999) both argue that Norway’s
oil wealth helps explain why it remained out of the European
Union (EU); Hoekman and Messerlin (2002) claim that
Arab countries have made little progress toward regional inte-
gration, partly because of their oil wealth; and Stubbs (2000)
argues that falling oil prices led petroleum-rich Indonesia to
seek deeper cooperation with the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN). A model developed by Venables
(2011) shows that regional integration will be unattractive for
resource-rich countries because they already have easy access
to foreign markets and, hence, little incentive to remove im-
port barriers. Davis and Wilf’s (2011) analysis of membership
in the World Trade Organization (WTO) notes in passing
that oil exporters are less likely to apply.
This article is the first to demonstrate that oil exports
have a broad, negative association with institutionalized
cooperation. It discusses two mechanisms that can explain
this pattern and presents evidence that is consistent with
them. Testing these claims proves difficult with currently
available data. Hence, we regard our analysis of these
mechanisms only as suggestive.
Our main independent variable is a country’s oil and
gas exports as a fraction of its total exports (hereafter Oil
Exports). Our key dependent variable is the decision by
states to join IGOs, which is the best-studied measure of
institutionalized cooperation. We employ an updated
measure of IGO membership developed by Boehmer,
Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) that divides IGOs into
three categories based on the magnitude of their sover-
eignty costs. This allows us to evaluate our claim that oil
exporters may still participate in low-cost institutions even
if they shun medium- or high-cost institutions. To make
sure that our findings are not sensitive to the way we code
this indicator, we replicate our models using two alterna-
tive measures of cooperation: Voeten’s (2012)
Commitment to International Jurisdiction (CIJ) Index,
which gauges a country’s commitments to legally binding
adjudicatory bodies, and the KOF index of political glob-
alization, which represents the number of international
organizations a country has joined, the international trea-
ties they have signed, UN Security Council Missions they
participate in, and the foreign embassies they host
(Dreher 2006). In our exploration of causal mechanisms,
we show that Oil Exports is negatively correlated with Allee
and Peinhardt’s (2010) measure of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) that bind states, or bind their trade part-
ners, to third-party dispute resolution.
In the next section, we explain why oil exports
should theoretically be linked to reduced cooperation. To
illustrate our arguments, we discuss the cases of
Venezuela, Sudan, and Norway. In the second section, we
describe our regression analysis, and in the third section,
we provide evidence that the oil-cooperation relationship
can be explained by our two economic mechanisms and
not by an alternative mechanism—the paucity of democ-
racy in the oil-rich states. We conclude in the final section.
How Does Oil Affect Cooperation?
International relations scholars have long sought to un-
derstand how the growth of economic interdependence
since World War II might be connected to institutional-
ized cooperation between states. Many argue that when
states seek to attract FDI and gain access to foreign mar-
kets, they gain an incentive to make costly commitments
to international institutions (Haas 1964; Keohane 1982;
Ruggie 1982; Haggard and Simmons 1987). These institu-
tions can facilitate the harmonization of regulations, coordi-
nate the removal of trade barriers, monitor the behavior of
member states, deter cheating, provide for third-party dis-
pute resolution, and more generally reduce transaction
costs, thus helping states realize gains from trade and attract
FDI (Keohane 1982, 1984). Yet, joining these institutions
also entails costs, because it compels states to make policy
compromises or relinquish a portion of their sovereignty.
Countries with substantial petroleum wealth might lack
these motives: if they find it atypically easy to gain both
FDI and market access, participation will bring them
fewer benefits. The higher the sovereignty costs of institu-
tionalized cooperation, the less likely these benefits will
outweigh their costly commitments.
Easy foreign investment
The fear of expropriation inhibits foreign direct investment.
Once a firm makes a highly specific investment in a foreign
2 Oil and International Cooperation
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country, the host government will be tempted to change the
terms of the investment to gain a greater share of the profit
(Vernon 1971, 46; Jensen 2008, 46–50). Expropriations
have become less frequent in recent decades, but foreign in-
vestors still face the more-subtle danger that host govern-
ments will use “changes in regulation, taxation, tariffs and
fees, or selective law enforcement” to reduce the invest-
ment’s profitability (Bu¨the and Milner 2008, 744).
Governments are better able to attract FDI if they
can credibly assure investors that their property rights
will be protected. One way to do this is by harmoniz-
ing regulations through international regimes. Another
is by participating in broad-based institutions that cre-
ate linkages between the protections they offer to for-
eign investors and the benefits they accrue in other
domains. A third strategy is to join organizations and
sign agreements that include commitments to binding
arbitration by neutral third parties in the event of dis-
putes with foreign investors. The more that govern-
ments demonstrate their willingness to be bound by
international adjudicatory bodies, the lower the per-
ceived risk for foreign investors.
Several statistical studies offer support for this argu-
ment by demonstrating that foreign direct investment is
boosted in countries that sign bilateral investment treaties
(Busse, Ko¨niger, and Nunnenkamp 2010; Tobin and
Rose-Ackerman 2011), that participate in a variety of trade
agreements (Berger et al. 2012; Bu¨the and Milner 2008,
2014), or that join a broad range of institutions (Dreher,
Mikosch, and Voigt 2014). This argument should not
hold, however, for states that can attract investors without
making costly commitments. There are three reasons why
oil-exporting states might fall into this category (Hogan
and Sturzenegger 2010).
The first is oil’s strategic importance, which can make
overseas investors—many of them implicitly or explicitly
backed by oil-importing governments—willing to invest in
risky petroleum ventures to gain more secure access to en-
ergy supplies. For example, in the first decade of the
2000s, Sudan looked like an unattractive destination for
FDI: the government was fighting an insurgency in the
country’s south and was implicated in massacres in the
Darfur region. In 2004 and 2005, the UN Security Council
imposed sanctions on Sudan, which included a ban on
weapons sales, a freeze on the assets of key officials, and a
travel ban. The United States first imposed economic,
financial, and trade sanctions on Sudan in 1997, and these
were tightened in 2007. Yet, from 2000 to 2009, Sudan
received large investments in its petroleum sector from
state-owned companies in China (China National
Petroleum Company), India (Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Videsh), and Malaysia (Petronas) (Yager
2010, 38). These investments helped the country triple its
oil production.
A second explanation may be the exceptional profitabil-
ity of many petroleum-sector investments. Jensen and
Johnston (2011) developed and tested a model in which
investors weighed the expected risks of expropriation
against the expected benefits from FDI. Because the ex-
pected benefits of extracting resource wealth are unusu-
ally high, investors were willing to accept higher
expropriation risks.
The expectation of supranormal profits could help ex-
plain the behavior of investors in Venezuela. During the
1999–2013 presidency of Hugo Chavez, Venezuela proved
to be a challenging environment for foreign investors.
From 2004 to 2011, for instance, the government
expropriated 1,087 private companies.2 These included
major oil companies owned by ExxonMobil and
ConocoPhillips, both of which sought arbitration after
Venezuela offered them compensation that they deemed
inadequate. After an international arbitration panel ruled
in favor of ExxonMobil, the Venezuelan government
vowed it would not abide by the ruling; it later abandoned
the World Bank’s dispute resolution body altogether.3 Yet,
Venezuela continued to enjoy new FDI in petroleum
throughout the Chavez years. In 2011, for example, it re-
ceived major new petroleum investments from both state-
backed firms and private companies (Gurmendi 2011),
perhaps because firms believed that the chance for excep-
tional profits would justify the exceptional risk.
Finally, oil-exporting countries seem to have little need
for FDI in their non-oil sectors, due to both the Dutch
Disease and the availability of domestic investment. The
Dutch Disease occurs when a country’s natural resource
exports boom. This tends to drive up real wages and ex-
change rates, which makes its other tradable goods too
costly to compete in global markets (Corden and Neary
1982; Neary and van Wijnbergen 1986). The more oil a
country exports, the less able it is to profitably export
other kinds of goods. Harding and Venables (2013, 2), for
example, find that for each additional dollar of resource
revenues, countries tend to see a decrease of seventy-five
cents in nonresource exports.4
This implies that as long as oil production is sufficiently
high and profitable, there is little reason for oil-rich states
to seek FDI in other sectors. To the extent that they need
investments in their non-oil economy, they can use their
repatriated oil revenues because most oil-rich states have
difficulty absorbing these revenues domestically, and they
often accumulate large sovereign wealth funds. Moreover,
increased access to revenues is rewarded in sovereign debt
markets, thus providing an alternative route to attract cap-
ital without the need to reassure investors about expropri-
ation (Wellhausen 2015).
Collectively, these three factors—the strategic motives
of foreign investors, the oil sector’s high profitability, and
the diminished need for non-oil finance—could leave oil-
rich countries with a much-reduced incentive to make
costly commitments to attract FDI.
Easy access to foreign markets
When states seek to boost their exports they gain an in-
centive to participate in international regimes, which can
facilitate the removal of tariff and nontariff barriers, pro-
mote issue linkage, and establish common standards that
foster the transboundary flow of goods, money, informa-
tion, and people. The literature broadly recognizes the
link between export incentives and institutionalization
(e.g., Moravcsik 1998; Ingram, Robinson, and Busch 2005;
Davis 2004), even if quantitative studies do not always find
correlations between trade dependence and membership
in international organizations (Mansfield and Pevehouse
2006, 2008).
2“Venezuelan government seizes 1,087 companies in seven years,” El
Universal, December 9, 2011.
3“Venezuela Vows to Reject Arbitration in Exxon Case,” New York Times,
January 8, 2012. Petroleum-exporting Bolivia and Ecuador also withdrew from
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
over similar disputes. The relationship between oil exports and reliance on
ICSID is examined more systematically subsequently in this article.
4Also see Magud and Sosa’s (2010) meta-analysis of research on the Dutch
Disease.
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Oil-exporting countries are generally able to gain access
to foreign markets without granting reciprocal access to
their trade partners, giving them less incentive to make
costly commitments to broader trade regimes. This re-
flects the unusually low elasticity of petroleum demand.
Countries need an uninterrupted flow of oil and gas to
fuel their ground, air, and maritime transportation; there
are no ready substitutes for these fuels; and it is difficult
to stockpile them in large quantities. As a result, oil-
importing states are unusually eager to avoid disruptions
in their petroleum supplies.5 As Keohane and Nye (1977,
9) observe, this creates an asymmetrical interdependence
between oil importers and oil exporters: the former are
more dependent on the latter than the reverse.
To obtain a steady supply of petroleum at the lowest
possible cost, most states import it with few restrictions.
The WTO compiles data on import restrictions around
the world by product group, and it reports that petroleum
is the product group most frequently imported duty free
(WTO 2011).6 This makes it hard for oil-importing states
to bargain for reciprocal access to the domestic markets
of their oil suppliers. It also allows oil-rich countries to en-
joy access to foreign markets while protecting their own
markets from foreign competition.
Consider the case of Norway. At first glance, Norway
seems to defy our theory: although a major oil producer,
it is well known for its active diplomacy and foreign aid
programs. Yet, unlike other Western European states, it
never committed itself to the European political integra-
tion project. While the Norwegian government applied
for membership to the European Community in 1967,
Norwegian voters rejected membership in 1972, the year
after Norway began to extract North Sea oil. Following a
decade of low oil prices, the Norwegian government ap-
plied for membership a second time in 1992. But, by the
time this second referendum was held in 1994, new off-
shore oil fields had come into production, boosting ex-
ports to record levels and leading to a surge in gross
domestic product (GDP) growth; once again, Norwegian
voters rejected the referendum.
According to Moses and Jenssen (1998, 221), the reluc-
tance of Norwegians to participate in the EU reflects the
ease with which they can export their oil:
Thus, while the Norwegian economy is most depen-
dent on European markets as receptors for its im-
ports, the specific nature of its export economy
makes it less susceptible to economic blackmail. The
importance of oil and petroleum imports to the
European economies makes it highly unlikely that
they will close off their markets to Norwegian ex-
ports. Because of this, Norwegian voters may have
decided against membership despite its export de-
pendence on Europe.
According to Venables (2011), who uses a two-country
model to illustrate this effect, although a resource-poor
country would gain from signing a trade agreement with a
resource-rich country, the resource-rich country—which
already faces low export barriers in global markets—would
not. This implies that resource-rich countries will shun
trade agreements and, more broadly, regional integration.
But should not oil-rich states still benefit from lower
trade barriers, which would help them boost their non-oil
exports? Maybe, but not very much. The Dutch Disease cre-
ates a structural barrier to export diversification. This
means that oil-exporting countries have little to gain from
broad international regimes that facilitate across-the-board
reductions in tariffs. The only good they can profitably
export—petroleum—already enjoys unfettered access to
foreign markets, while their other tradable goods are too
expensive to gain a foothold in these same markets. The
Dutch Disease also creates a second problem. The height-
ened value of the currency makes imported goods cheaper,
which gives business and labor groups outside the oil sector
a strong incentive to support protectionist trade policies.
The case of Venezuela again provides a helpful illustra-
tion. In the late 1950s, talks began to form a Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).7 Venezuela
adopted the position—which it repeated many times in
subsequent negotiations—that it could not take part with-
out a guarantee of protection for its high-cost manufactur-
ing sector. When Venezuela finally ratified a much-
watered-down LAFTA treaty in 1966, it stipulated that it
would continue to protect its nonfuel industries, because
they could not compete with similar industries in other
LAFTA members.
In the late 1960s, Venezuela raised similar objections to
the effort to form an Andean Common Market (later
known as the Andean Community), which was designed
to have stronger enforcement mechanisms than LAFTA.
Domestically, Venezuelan economic interests were split
with the government and the state-owned oil company fa-
voring integration, but the private sector (represented by
the Federation of Chambers and Associations of Trade
and Production [FEDECAMARAS], the country’s most
important business association) strongly opposing it.
Frustrated with Venezuela’s recalcitrance, the other coun-
tries (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) signed
an initial accord in 1969. Finally, Venezuela’s belief that it
would soon run out of oil (which turned out to be mis-
taken) and an agreement by other members to grant
Venezuela’s domestic industry’s special protections, led
Venezuela to join the Andean Common Market in 1973.
Over the next three decades, Venezuela adopted a para-
doxical stance toward regional integration: it continued to
participate in the Andean Community and the Latin
America Integration Association (the successor to
LAFTA), yet it found ways to protect its manufacturing
and agricultural sectors. Its import-weighted tariff average
was 40 to 50 percent higher than the average for Latin
America, and its nontariff barriers were unusually steep
(World Bank 2008, 1–2; WTO 2002, 8). In the World
Bank’s 2010 ranking of countries by their facilitation of
free trade, Venezuela ranked 172 out of 183 states.
Among the 32 countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Venezuela ranked 32.8
Similarly, petroleum-exporting Indonesia long had the
least-open economy in ASEAN and was hostile towards in-
tra-ASEAN trade liberalization. So was oil-exporting
Malaysia. Thanks in part to their indifference, a series of
5These qualities also make the uninterrupted flow of petroleum more im-
portant—both economically and politically—than the uninterrupted flow of
others types of minerals, which are used for less-essential purposes and can
typically be stockpiled.
6See supplementary files. The only group of countries to place significant
restrictions on petroleum imports are the oil producers themselves, who guard
their oil industries from competition.
7The account of Venezuela’s trade positions in the 1960s and 1970s is
based on Avery (1976).
8See www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (accessed August 15, 2011).
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intra-ASEAN trade initiatives (including the ASEAN
Industrial Project [AIP], ASEAN Industrial Complementa-
tion [AIC] and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture) all
foundered. But the tumble in world oil prices in the late
1980s and early 1990s led both governments to reassess
their policies toward trade, foreign investment, and re-
gional integration (Basri and Hill 2004, 633–34). Faced
with a need to both increase nonpetroleum exports and
attract FDI, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments
began to favor regional trade integration, leading to a
1992 agreement to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area,
which became known as AFTA (Stubbs 2000).
Similarly, in Mexico, free trade long was “the policy op-
tion that dare not speak its name” (Golob 2003, 370). Yet,
falling oil prices and increasing interest rates created a
desperate need for revenue in the early 1980s. Between
1985 and 1999, Mexico joined the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), North Atlantic Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the WTO, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and
signed over twenty regional and bilateral economic inte-
gration agreements as part of an explicit strategy to diver-
sify exports (Gallagher 2004, 8; Waithe, Lorde, and
Francis 2011). In that period, Mexican oil exports
dropped from 80 percent to 10 percent of total exports.
Thus, drops in oil income may make international institu-
tions more appealing to countries that previously resisted
greater integration.
Many studies suggest that countries have at least two
economic motives for participating in international insti-
tutions: to increase FDI and to improve access to foreign
markets.9 Oil wealth helps countries achieve these goals
even without institutionalized cooperation.
Regression Analysis
If our theory is correct, a country’s petroleum exports
should be negatively correlated with institutionalized co-
operation, and its nonfuel exports should be positively
correlated with institutionalized cooperation. Our theory
also implies two nuances in the oil-cooperation relation-
ship. First, petroleum should only matter when exports
are large enough to begin triggering the Dutch Disease
and crowding out nonresource exports. Countries that
only produce small amounts of oil for domestic use
should still have diversified export portfolios, and hence
still benefit from institutionalized cooperation to gain FDI
and foreign access for their non-oil exports. Second, oil
exporters should be more inclined to reject institutions
with high sovereignty costs. We assume countries partici-
pate in international institutions when the benefits out-
weigh the costs. Because oil exporters receive fewer
benefits, they should only join institutions whose sover-
eignty costs are commensurately low. The higher the sov-
ereignty costs, the less likely that oil-rich states will join.
The narrowest version of our argument implies that pe-
troleum exports should diminish participation in institu-
tions designed to foster investment or trade. A broader
interpretation—one that reflects a functionalist perspective
in which cooperation on economic issues leads to coopera-
tion on noneconomic issues—suggests that oil exports will
inhibit cooperation in a wider range of domains. We treat
this as an issue to be resolved by empirical analysis.
Independent variable
We argue that a country’s oil exports, rather than its over-
all oil production, inhibits cooperation. Moreover, the
more petroleum exports dominate a country’s trade rela-
tionships, the larger the effect on cooperation. Hence,
our main independent variable is Oil Exports, defined as
the value of a country’s net oil and gas exports as a frac-
tion of its total exports. For countries like Singapore that
do not produce oil or gas domestically but are merely
trans-shipment points, Oil Exports are set at zero.10
This measure could be partly endogenous to some of
the outcomes we are estimating.11 To mitigate this con-
cern, we replicate our estimations using two alternative
measures of oil wealth. The first is a dummy variable for
major oil exporters. It takes the value one if oil exports
make up at least 50 percent of its total exports in a given
year. As a dichotomous variable, it is relatively insensitive
to short-term endogenous production decisions.12
The second is a country’s oil income per capita, which
is the monetary value of a country’s oil and gas produc-
tion in constant 2000 dollars divided by its midyear popu-
lation. To mitigate the skewed distribution of values and
reduce the influence of outliers, we use the natural log of
oil income (plus one) in our estimations. By focusing on
domestic oil production instead of oil exports, and nor-
malizing it by population instead of by total exports, we
remove two possible sources of endogeneity. The oil in-
come measures are drawn from Ross (2011).
Dependent variables
Our key dependent variable is an updated measure of
membership in IGOs developed by Boehmer, Gartzke,
and Nordstrom (2004) and updated by Ingram,
Robinson, and Busch (2005), which divides IGOs into
three categories based on their sovereignty costs: “mini-
malist” IGOs that either exist only on paper, or have a
minimal organizational structure and cannot compel
member states to take action; “structured” IGOs that have
codified procedures, well-specified mechanisms for ap-
pointing or electing officials, manage programs that pro-
duce concrete benefits, and can make decisions that are
binding on member states; and “interventionist” IGOs,
like the EU or the Arab League, that have “clear mecha-
nisms for coercing or influencing state behavior”
(Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004, 37–38). If our
argument is correct, oil exports should be negatively cor-
related with membership in structuralist and intervention-
ist IGOs, but we have no strong expectations about their
9These two motives may be intertwined: one recent study, using a survey
of firms that excluded the natural-resource sector, found that being a signa-
tory to international economic treaties attracts FDI precisely because it enables
the investing companies to take advantage of lower trade barriers with the
home country (Kenyon and Margalit 2014, 3).
10The data comes from the World Development Indicators (World Bank
2012). Missing values were imputed (using regression analysis) with data from
the US Energy Information Administration. If both sources had missing data,
the values were left missing.
11A country’s oil exports represent the difference between its domestic
production and domestic consumption; the latter reflects the overall size and
health of the economy. Other things being equal, oil-endowed poor countries
export more oil than similarly endowed rich countries because rich countries
consume more of their oil domestically. If the government of an oil-endowed
country is less willing to guarantee the property rights of foreign investors
(one of our outcomes), and this hurts the non-oil sector more than the oil
sector (as our theory suggests), it could make a country more dependent on
its oil exports even if oil production is unaffected.
12Although the 50 percent threshold is arbitrary, we believe countries that
pass it are likely to be experiencing Dutch Disease effects.
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participation in minimalist IGOs. For convenience, we
combine the measures of structured and interventionist
IGOs into the single measure Costly IGOs.13
We also test our claims with two alternative measures of
cooperation. The first is the KOF index of political globaliza-
tion, which represents the number of international organiza-
tions a country has joined, the international treaties they
have signed, the UN Security Council Missions they partici-
pate in, and the foreign embassies they host (Dreher 2006).
The other is the CIJ Index, which measures the degree
to which states accept treaty provisions that give interna-
tional judicial bodies greater authority. It is based on
three equally weighted subindices: commitments to gen-
eral international law, commitments to economic law, and
commitments to human rights and security. The scale
runs from 0 (no acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction) to
100 (full acceptance of available international judicial au-
thorities) (Voeten 2012).14 We limit all analyses to the
1970–2006 period for data availability reasons (2005 when
IGOs are the dependent variables). Table 1 shows the
descriptive statistics for all variables.
As a robustness test, we also replicate a recent study by
Donno, Metzger, and Russett (2015) that takes dyadic
pairs of states and IGOs as the unit of analysis, and we add
our Oil Exports measure to their model; we describe the
main results in the text and provide the full results in the
supplementary materials.
In the final section of the analysis, when we examine
causal mechanisms, we also consider whether Oil Exports
are associated with BITs that bind them, or bind their
trade partners, to third-party dispute resolution.
Regression Analysis
We begin by considering the association between Oil
Exports and our dependent variables in a simple Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression framework, including
both country and year fixed effects.15 Table 2 estimates
the relationships between Oil Exports and each of the de-
pendent variables, adding no controls beyond the country
and year fixed effects. While Oil Exports is not significantly
associated with membership in minimalist IGOs (model
1), it is strongly associated with the three measures of
more-costly cooperation: Costly IGOs (model 2), Political
Globalization (model 3), and CIJ (model 4).
Table 3 displays a series of robustness tests, keeping
Costly IGOs as the dependent variable. We control for four
familiar correlates of IGO membership: income per cap-
ita, because we expect wealthier states to more frequently
join IGOs; Polity, a 21-point measure of political regime
characteristics (Marshall and Jaggers 2011), to account for
the well-documented effects of democracy on IGO mem-
bership; the natural log of population and population
squared, because we expect larger countries to be more
cooperative; and for a country’s overall trade dependence
(exports plus imports divided by GDP), because we are
claiming that oil-exporting states are politically uncooper-
ative given their integration with the global economy. All
right-hand side variables are lagged by one year.
Model 5 shows that including these covariates has little
effect on the size and significance of the Oil Exports coeffi-
cient. The substantive size of the effect is comparable to
that of democracy, which is the factor most frequently
highlighted in the literature on international organiza-
tions. In the fixed effects specification, a one standard de-
viation increase in Polity is associated with a 0.25 average
increase and a one standard deviation increase in Oil
Exports with a 0.28 decrease in Costly IGOs.
To see if our results are driven by the oil-rich states of
the Middle East, in model 6 we exclude the region’s fif-
teen states from the sample; this causes the absolute value
of the Oil Exports coefficient to rise, suggesting the
cooperation-inhibiting effects of petroleum are not tied to
the Middle East region.16
In models 7 and 8, we replace Oil Exports with alterna-
tive measures: our Major Oil Exporters dummy variable
(model 7) and Oil Income (model 8), both of which should
be less affected by endogeneity. In both models, the oil
variable remains negatively associated with Costly IGOs.
Consistent with our expectations, the effects of Oil Income
are quadratic: the domestic production of small amounts
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean sd Min Max
Minimal IGOs 5941 19.23 11.50 0.00 60.00
Costly IGOs 5941 30.71 10.78 0.00 68.00
Pol glob 6129 48.83 23.68 1.55 98.26
CIJ index 5838 26.74 19.33 0.00 92.19
Oil exports 4080 0.13 0.28 0.00 1.00
Major oil exporter 4080 0.12 0.33 0 1
Oil income (ln) 5509 2.39 2.91 0 11.15
Oil exports per capita (ln) 4077 1.41 2.60 0 10.19
Nonoil exports per capita (ln) 4077 5.71 1.88 0 10.89
GDP per capita (ln) 5497 7.87 1.59 3.91 11.75
Merchandise trade/GDP (%) 5285 57.06 51.15 88.56 986.65
Population (ln) 6853 15.19 2.15 8.90 20.99
Polity 5035 0.41 7.62 10 10
Democracy 6000 0.44 0.50 0 1
Note: CIJ, Commitment to International Jurisdiction; GDP, gross
domestic product; IGOs, intergovernmental organizations.
Table 2. International cooperation and oil exports (fixed year and
country effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Minimal IGOs Costly IGOs Pol Glob CIJ Index
Oil Exports 0.02 0.91*** 6.27*** 7.34***
(0.44) (0.34) (1.12) (1.28)
Constant 12.30*** 22.38*** 41.26*** 13.80***
(0.28) (0.22) (0.78) (0.84)
Observations 3,930 3,930 4,744 4,093
R-squared 0.79 0.90 0.64 0.76
Number of countries 176 176 177 176
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. CIJ, Commitment to
International Jurisdiction; IGOs, intergovernmental organizations.
*p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
13Oil Exports has the same relationship with each measure under all of the
conditions we examine, so combining them does not affect our results.
14The measure takes into account partial commitments through nonratifi-
cation of optional clauses and reservations. For example, a state’s commitment
to the International Court of Justice is measured by whether it accepts its com-
pulsory jurisdiction with subtractions for reservations that limit the court’s spa-
tial, temporal, or geographical jurisdiction (Mitchell and Powell 2009).
Moreover, states score higher when they ratify more treaties that accept the
International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction via compromissory clauses. For fur-
ther details, see the supplementary materials and Voeten (2012).
15All of our regression results are robust to the use of random rather than
fixed effects.
16Because we include country fixed effects in our model, we cannot add
regional dummies.
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of petroleum (below about $100 per capita, which in most
cases is too little to export) appears to have no coopera-
tion-reducing effects.17 Oil wealth only seems to inhibit
IGO membership when it is abundant enough to export.
Table 4 evaluates the substantive importance of oil ex-
ports by comparing it to the impact of democracy, which
has been well explored in earlier studies (e.g., Mansfield,
Milner, and Pevehouse 2008). To simplify, we compare
our dichotomous measure, Major Oil Exporter, to the di-
chotomous measure of democracy coded by Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Given that this is a fixed ef-
fects model with dichotomous independent variables, this
is a difference-in-difference estimator. Across each of the
four cooperation measures, the impact of being a major
oil exporter is more than twice as large as the impact of
being a democracy. In this specification, Major Oil Exporter
is also associated with reduced participation in minimal
IGOs, but this effect is not consistent across the specifica-
tions we estimated (see also Table 2). Note that the eco-
nomic variables have no consistent effect on any of the
outcomes, which is in keeping with other studies of IGO
membership.
Table 5 employs a dynamic model to evaluate our claim
that fuel exports have a negative effect, and nonfuel ex-
ports have a positive effect, on institutionalized coopera-
tion. We employ a single equation error-correction
model, which is widely used in political science to analyze
both cointegrated and stationary time-series data
(e.g., Beck 2001).18 The outcome is the change in each of
our dependent variables, and the models include lagged
levels of the dependent variable and changes and lags in
the independent variables. The coefficients on the
changes in the independent variables imply immediate ef-
fects while the coefficients on the lagged terms capture
Table 3. Oil wealth and joining costly IGOs, regressions with fixed
country and year fixed effects
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables
(w/o
Middle
East)
Dummy
exporter
variable
Oil
income
Oil exports 0.88** 1.28***
(0.35) (0.47)
Major oil exporter 0.95***
(0.21)
Oil income 0.40***
(0.09)
Oil income squared 0.05***
(0.01)
Trade/GDP 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.37* 0.71*** 0.40** 1.07***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.16)
Polity 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Population 3.99** 3.73* 3.79** 2.66
(1.81) (2.14) (1.80) (1.63)
Population squared 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant 77.02*** 61.33*** 74.85*** 52.24***
(15.48) (18.32) (15.46) (13.42)
Observations 3,285 2,772 3,285 4,245
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89
Number of countries 144 123 144 152
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. GDP, gross domestic product;
IGOs, intergovernmental organizations. *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
Table 4. Democracy, oil exporter status, and international coopera-
tion (fixed country and year effects)
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables
Minimal
IGOs
Costly
IGOs
CIJ
index
Pol
Glob
Major oil exporter 0.79*** 0.92*** 3.76*** 3.11***
(0.28) (0.21) (0.79) (0.71)
Democracy 0.01 0.36*** 1.62*** 1.54***
(0.16) (0.12) (0.45) (0.41)
Trade/GDP 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.76*** 0.29 2.76*** 7.93***
(0.25) (0.19) (0.70) (0.61)
Population 9.63*** 1.35 41.95*** 0.64
(2.26) (1.70) (6.33) (5.34)
Population squared 0.28*** 0.07 1.89*** 0.72***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.19) (0.17)
Constant 62.44*** 57.80*** 159.24*** 181.61***
(19.36) (14.53) (54.12) (45.56)
Observations 3,604 3,604 3,765 4,212
R-squared 0.81 0.92 0.80 0.66
Number of countries 168 168 169 169
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. CIJ, Commitment to
International Jurisdiction; GDP, gross domestic product; IGOs, inter-
governmental organizations. *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
Table 5. Change in international cooperation by fuel and nonfuel
exports (with country fixed effects
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Variables
D. Minimal
IGOs
D. Costly
IGOs
D. Pol
Glob
D. CJI
index
Lagged DV 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
L. Fuel exports
per capita
0.02 0.02** 0.08** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
D. Fuel exports
per capita
0.05 0.02 0.11 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07)
L. Nonfuel exports
per capita
0.04 0.01 0.11 0.14*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
D. Nonfuel exports
per capita
0.09 0.36*** 0.09 0.62**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.31) (0.28)
L. GDP per capita 0.00 0.05 0.19* 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09)
D. GDP per capita 0.55 0.25 2.33* 1.63
(0.52) (0.38) (1.26) (1.09)
L. Democracy 0.07 0.20*** 0.11 0.41***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.15)
D. Democracy 0.20* 0.10 0.21 0.27
(0.11) (0.09) (0.69) (0.29)
L. Population 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.50*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04)
D. Population 5.51*** 5.01*** 2.49 16.08***
(1.73) (1.67) (8.47) (4.83)
Constant 0.39 0.68** 6.85*** 1.81**
(0.28) (0.30) (1.29) (0.77)
Observations 3,566 3,566 3,946 3,723
Number of countries 168 168 169 168
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Trinomial time trend and Cold
War dummy omitted from table. CIJ, Commitment to International
Jurisdiction; GDP, gross domestic product; IGOs, intergovernmental
organizations; L, lagged; D, difference; DV, dependent variable.
*p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
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longer-term equilibrium effects. We include Fuel and
Nonfuel Exports per capita to distinguish the effects of differ-
ent sources of exports.19 The remaining control variables
are the same as those found in the earlier regressions.
In model 13, where the outcome is change in Minimal
IGOs, neither Fuel Exports nor Nonfuel Exports has a signifi-
cant effect. When the outcome is change in Costly IGOs
(model 14) and change in Political Globalization (model 15),
Fuel Exports have a negative equilibrium effect. In model 16,
in which the outcome is change in CIJ Index, the lagged
and difference terms for Fuel Exports are negative and
jointly significant. Conversely, Nonfuel Exports have an im-
mediate, positive association with changes in Costly IGOs
(model 14) and both an immediate and a long-term posi-
tive effect on changes in CIJ Index (model 16). In model
15, where the outcome is change in Political Globalization,
the lagged and difference terms for Nonfuel Exports are posi-
tive and jointly significant. More generally, all the coeffi-
cients on Fuel Exports are negative and all the coefficients
on Nonfuel Exports are positive. We interpret these results as
broadly consistent with our argument that oil exports tend
to hurt costly forms of international cooperation while
other types of exports tend to promote costly cooperation.
A dichotomous indicator also allows us to graphically
represent the differential effect that economic intercon-
nectedness has on political globalization in oil-rich and
oil-poor states. Figure 1 does so using simple fixed effects
regressions that include interactions between oil exporter
status and the share of a country’s GDP that comes from
merchandise trade (other than oil exports). For oil-poor
countries, a higher share of trade to GDP correlates with
higher levels of political globalization and more-binding
commitments to IGOs with compulsory jurisdiction. This
relationship does not hold for oil-rich states. Simply in-
cluding trade as a proportion of GDP in the regression
analysis would have delivered a null result. It is only
through the interaction with oil exporter status that we
uncover the divergent effects that economic interconnec-
tedness has on institutionalized cooperation.
In the supplementary materials we demonstrate that
our findings are unchanged when we add Oil Exports to a
model that takes state-IGO dyads as its unit of analysis
(Donno, Metzger, and Russett 2015). The focus on dyadic
pairs allows us to rule out the possibility that resource-rich
states join fewer IGOs because they happen to be located
in parts of the world that, for unrelated reasons, have
fewer IGOs. The Donno-Metzger-Russett model also ac-
counts for the probability that a state will be involved in a
militarized interstate dispute; this is also an important test
for our model because, under some conditions, oil rich
states may be unusually prone to interstate conflict, which
could explain why they join IGOs less frequently. We per-
form a replication of the published results and find that
Oil Exports have a negative and significant correlation with
the pairwise decision to join IGOs.
Mechanisms
Do the two hypothesized mechanisms account for the ad-
verse effects of oil exports on institutionalized coopera-
tion? We can only address this issue in a limited way due
to the paucity of data on oil-sector investments and trade
access. Still, we demonstrate below that the available data
are consistent with the two mechanisms, but not with a
third possible mechanism: the effect of oil wealth on a
country’s regime type.
The “Easy Foreign Investment” Mechanism
Our first hypothesized mechanism is that oil wealth redu-
ces cooperation by giving a state easy access to FDI, dimin-
ishing its incentive to sign international agreements to
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Figure 1. Oil exporter status and international cooperation by trade dependence.
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protect the property rights of foreign investors. We scruti-
nize this mechanism by examining treaties that are de-
signed to protect the property rights of foreign investors.
If this argument is valid, we should observe that oil-rich
states are unusually reluctant to agree to strong protec-
tions for foreign investors on their soil.20
We hence focus on the provisions contained in the
BITs signed by oil exporters and their trade partners.
These treaties determine how governments will handle
compensation claims from foreign firms whose assets they
have expropriated. Many providers of political risk insur-
ance will not underwrite investments in developing coun-
tries unless a BIT is in place (UNCTAD 2006). Typically,
BITs specify a home country from which most of the in-
vestment originates and a host country toward which the
investment is directed.
For home states, BITs usually offer strong legal protec-
tion for large foreign investors. For the host government,
BITs help them attract foreign investors by making com-
mitments to refrain from expropriation, which may also
aid in attracting new trade agreements with the home
country (Tobin and Busch 2010). To make these commit-
ments more credible, some BITs delegate the authority to
resolve disputes to an international institution (usually
the World Bank’s ICSID). Rulings by ICSID are numer-
ous, public, closely watched by investors, and are conse-
quential for future FDI streams (Allee and Peinhardt
2011). They also generate sovereignty costs for host gov-
ernments, who would typically prefer to have any disputes
resolved by their own domestic courts or ad hoc arbitral
tribunals whose decisions they could influence (Franck
2007).
If the foreign investment mechanism is valid,
petroleum-rich states should have fewer incentives to
make costly commitments to attract foreign investors: they
may still sign BITs in order to satisfy the requirements of
the political insurance industry, but they should be less
likely to agree to the most costly provision (mandatory dis-
pute resolution by ICSID).
Allee and Peinhardt (2010) code all publicly archived
BITs for their level of delegation to ICSID. They create an
ordinal variable, coded 0 in the absence of any delegation,
1 if ICSID is one of the options for dispute resolutions,
and 2 if ICSID is the only venue for international arbitra-
tion. They argue that this variable reflects the degree of
delegation in an ordinal way because governments usually
have some control over the venue of arbitration if ICSID
is only one of more options. Allee and Peinhardt identify
a range of characteristics of host countries and home
countries, as well as the bilateral relationship, that would
make it more or less likely that a BIT will include an
ICSID provision.21
In Table 6, we replicate their original ordered logit esti-
mations (model 17), then add our Oil Exports variable for
host countries; the coefficient is negative and statistically
significant at the p¼ .05 level (model 18). One shortcom-
ing of this specification is that we do not consider dyads
in which both host and home countries are major oil ex-
porters. In model 19 we address this contingency by add-
ing an interaction term to control for these dyads; this
causes the negative effects of Oil Exports to grow larger
and significant at the p¼ .01 level. Interestingly, the re-
sults imply that in cases in which both home and host
countries are oil exporters, the host becomes more likely to
agree to ICSID arbitration, perhaps reflecting the fact that
both states have similar leverage over the terms of the
treaty. If we use dummy variables rather than the
continuous Oil Exporter variable to estimate these relation-
ships (model 20) the results are unchanged.
The disparity between the practices of oil exporters as
host countries and their practices as home countries is
consistent with the “easy FDI” mechanism. It implies that
the governments of oil exporters are not generally averse
to signing investment treaties—including ones with man-
datory ICSID jurisdiction—as long as these commitments
mostly constrain their nonfuel trade partners. Their ability
to negotiate these asymmetric provisions indicates they
have exceptionally strong bargaining leverage over the
terms of foreign investments.
The “Easy Access to Foreign Markets” Mechanism
Our second hypothesized mechanism is that oil exporters
are less cooperative because they have easy access to for-
eign markets, reducing their incentive to sign trade-facili-
tating agreements. One observable implication is that oil
exporters should enjoy atypically low barriers for their
own exports, yet maintain atypically high import barriers.
Data on effective import and export barriers, which
takes into account both tariff and nontariff barriers of
each country’s trade partners for each product they trade,
is scarce. The only cross-national data we are aware of on
“overall trade restrictiveness” was developed by Kee, Nicita,
and Olarreaga (2009) and includes both a weighted mea-
sure of the tariff and nontariff restrictions that countries
place on their imports and a weighted measure of the re-
strictions that the rest of the world places on their exports.
Data on both import and export restrictiveness are only
available for seventy-seven countries and a single year
(2008), yielding too few observations for an in-depth analy-
sis, but enough to look for suggestive evidence on the basic
differences between oil exporters and non-oil exporters.
Figure 2 shows the measure of import restrictions on
the horizontal axis and export restrictions on the vertical
axis; countries that produce at least $100 per capita in oil
and gas are marked with solid dots and country abbrevia-
tions. Twenty-two of the thirty-two oil producers lie below
the 45-degree line representing equal import and export
barriers; this indicates that they place more restrictions on
their imports than other countries place on their exports.
By contrast, thirty-three of the forty-five non-oil producers
place fewer restrictions on their imports than the rest of
the world places on their exports. This is consistent with
our hypothesized mechanism, which implies that relative
to non-oil countries, oil exporters will enjoy fewer restric-
tions on their exports, while placing greater restrictions
on their imports.
Does democracy explain the link between oil and cooperation?
An alternative mechanism might be generating our re-
sults: oil wealth could be making governments less demo-
cratic, which in turn might make them less cooperative.
Many researchers find that when authoritarian states have
more oil wealth, they become less likely to transition to
democracy (Ross 2001; Aslaksen 2010).22 Recent studies
also find that democracies are more cooperative than
nondemocracies and more likely to make credible com-
mitments to international institutions (Mansfield, Milner,
and Rosendorff 2002). Leaders in states that are democra-
tizing—and who are therefore uncertain that democratic
institutions will prevail—also have stronger incentives to
commit to international institutions, because they may
seek to lock in policies that a potentially undemocratic
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successor would find it costly to withdraw from (Moravcsik
2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). Hence, oil could
make states less likely to join international institutions by
making them less democratic.
Note, however, that our estimations in Tables 3, 4, and
5 control for the effects of democracy, alternatively using
the 21-point Polity scale, and the dichotomous Democracy
measure coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
(2010). Even after accounting for any role that democracy
may play, our estimations suggest that Oil Exports has a
substantively large and statistically robust effect on well-
established measures of institutionalized cooperation.
Conclusion
For most countries, economic integration and political co-
operation go hand-in-hand. As states become more inte-
grated through trade, finance, and labor migration, they
are incentivized to participate in intergovernmental insti-
tutions that harmonize regulations, stabilize relationships,
and foster multilateral cooperation. Conversely, joining
these institutions can help them attract foreign investors
and trade partners by demonstrating their support for in-
ternational standards, rules, and norms.
We show that the world’s petroleum exporters do not fol-
low this pattern. Rather, the more dependent they are on
oil exports, the less likely they are to join costly IGOs, to
agree to compulsory third party jurisdiction, and to achieve
a high score on the composite KOF Political Globalization
measure. Though testing explanations for this pattern pre-
sents a challenge, we find evidence that when countries
supply global markets with petroleum—the commodity on
which virtually all modern economies depend—they
appear to be liberated from the economic incentives that
lead other countries toward cooperation and reciprocity.
The uncooperative actions of the oil exporters matter a
great deal. Evidence suggests that some types of IGOs
help states resolve conflicts peacefully (Oneal, Russett,
and Berbaum 2003; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom
2004; Pevehouse and Russett 2006) and comply with inter-
national law (Simmons 2000). They also seem to foster a
convergence of interests among member states (Bearce
and Bondanella 2007).23 The more oil that a country ex-
ports, though, the less it enjoys these benefits.
We also suspect this can help explain why oil-rich coun-
tries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran so frequently seem
to violate international norms on a wide range of issues,
including safeguarding the property of foreigners, adher-
ing to reciprocal trade agreements, perhaps even financ-
ing of foreign insurgencies. It may also explain why other
oil exporters remain politically isolated, despite their
deep integration in the global economy.
Table 6. The effect of oil wealth on the willingness to sign BIT agreements with ICSID provisions (Replication from Allee and Peinhardt)
Variables (17) (18) (19) (20)
Oil exports/total exports host country 0.39** 0.48***
(0.16) (0.17)
Oil export dependence host* home country major oil exporter 1.11**
(0.56)
Host country major oil exporter 0.40**
(0.16)
Home country major oil exporter 0.20 0.16
(0.18) (0.17)
Host country major oil exporter* home country major oil exporter 0.50**
(0.25)
Presence of MNCs in home 1.65** 1.68** 1.36* 1.24
(0.71) (0.72) (0.74) (0.77)
Strength of legal institutions in home 0.09** 0.09** 0.08* 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Strength of legal institutions in host 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Durability of host regime 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Political constraints on executive in host 0.40** 0.29 0.26 0.24
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Alliance ties 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Colonial ties 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Domestic economic growth host 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Reliance on external financial assistance host 0.73* 0.58 0.63 0.63
(0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Export dependence host 0.01** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Right wing government host 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Host recently independent 0.26** 0.25** 0.21* 0.21*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Observations 1,031 1,031 982 939
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. BIT, Bilateral Investment Treaty; ICSID, International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes;
MNCs, Multinational Corporations. *p< .1, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
10 Oil and International Cooperation
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 21, 2015
http://isq.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
For scholars of international institutions, our study
contributes to a more fine-grained picture of the eco-
nomic forces that foster political integration. One key im-
plication is that being dependent on trade or finance is
not sufficient to foster participation in binding interna-
tional institutions. Instead, the need for foreign capital
and access to foreign markets carries more weight.
Finally, our study supplements the comparative politics
literature on the “resource curse,” which looks at the per-
verse economic and political consequences that can follow
the discovery of natural resource wealth. Most of this
scholarship looks at the consequences of oil or mineral
wealth for a country’s economy (Sachs and Warner 1995),
its conflict risk (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009;
Lujala 2010), and its institutions (Karl 1997; Jones and
Weinthal 2010; Ross 2012). This study contributes to a
newer body of research on the implications of oil wealth
for a country’s international role (Rudra and Jensen 2011;
Colgan 2010). It also revisits a question an earlier genera-
tion of scholars in the 1970s and 1980s raised: why the oil
exporters are a distinctive, and often troublesome, force
in the international system (Cowhey 1985; Tetreault 1985;
Wilson 1987).
States vary widely in their willingness to participate in
international institutions. For countries that are economi-
cally isolated or of marginal global importance, this might
not be cause for concern. Yet for countries that control
the world’s supply of petroleum, an unwillingness to coop-
erate should be worrisome because these states have ex-
traordinary influence over the economic fortunes and
security of other countries, but are relatively unfettered by
the international institutions that normally accompany
this level of influence.
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